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Despite contrary speeches on the corporate hustings, our free enter-
prise economy has yielded to a mixed economy of public regulation and
private industry.' Yet because public policymakers have not confronted
fundamental questions about its purpose, present economic regulation
lacks both a comprehensive theory and a consistent goal. This brief
comment argues that our unguided regulatory system undermines com-
petition and entrenches monopoly at the public's expense;2 it then
suggests what can be done about it.3
t This article represents a synthesis of many of the findings and arguments of a
number of critics of economic regulation in TnE MONOIOLY MAK:ERS (M. Green ed. 1973)
(forthcoming). Copyright @ 1973, R. Nader.
* B.A., 1967, Cornell University; J.D., 1970, Harvard University; Director, Corporate
Accountability Research Group, Washington, D.C.
** B.A., 1955, Princeton University; LL.B., 1958, Harvard University.
1. For the best discussion of this public-priate econom), see W. ADANIs & H. GRAY.
MoNoPOLY N AS EcmCA: THE GOVERNIENr As PROMOTER (1956) [hereinafter cited as Av.Ws
& GRAY]; W. HAMILTON, THE PoLrrics OF I.NDUsTMY (1957). Approximately twenty to
twenty-five percent of our national income is directly or indirectly controlled by federal
regulation and government enterprise. Caves, Direct Regulation and Market Performance
in the American Economy, 54 A.m. Eco-x. REV. 172 (Supp. May, 1964).
2. This assertion is not new. In 1956, Adams and Gray wrote, "Government today is,
in many instances a promoter of monopoly. It frequently puts together the very power
concentrates which the anti-trust authorities are later called upon to break asunder."
ADAMS & GRAY vii.
3. Three preliminary caveats should be noted. First, this comment takes as its operating
framework our traditional economic system of market and regulator, behavior. It does
not prejudge alternate economic modes, existing or theoretical, for allocating economic
resources and rights. Second, the focus is on fcderal economic regulation, such as our
market determinations concerning price and entry, but not health or safet) regulation.
See p. 885 infra. Third, page constraints imposed on this article precluded elaboration
of many points.
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I. Defects of Design and Process
A. Design
While the historical origins4 and constitutional basis5 of economic
regulation are relatively clear, its economic rationale is not. The most
common justification for regulation is natural monopoly. This situa-
tion arises when efficiency requires very large economies of scale; when
due to large, fixed costs, unit costs decline as the scale of production
increases.6 The installation of telephone lines and water mains are
classic examples.
There are problems, however, with this concept and its application.
7
First, it is not clear what constitutes a natural monopoly. Most observ-
ers assume interstate telephoning is one, yet microwave technology and
satellite communications have challenged that view.8 At one time fire-
fighting, sanitation, police protection, and electric utilities were all
privately and competitively operated. The Post Office, long considered
a classic natural monopoly, is now facing competition in the delivery
of mail.10 Thus, some care must be taken in defining natural monopoly,
for what may appear to be an inevitable state of non-competition may
be nothing more than a lack of imagination or an insensitivity to new
technology.
4. A variety of questionable rate practices usually by local and then national railroads,
led to the creation of regulatory commissions in the mid and late nineteenth century.
Thomas, An Answer to Regulation's Critics-Control of Administrative Agencies, 1 TULSA
L.J. 109, 114-17 (1964). The Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887 to
prevent predatory competition and rate discrimination and to stabilize the railroads'
revenues. See I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERsTATE COMMERCE CO-MMISSION (1931-1937). But see
G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965).
5. The constitutionality of economic regulation has been established since Mlunni v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1887), where the Court stated, "When . . .one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he ...must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good ...." See also, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
6. See, A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, 113-126 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KAHN]; Nelson, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 77 ANTI-TRuST
BULL. 1 (1966).
7. For criticism of the natural monopoly thesis, see Comanor, Should Natural Monopo.
lies Be Regulated?, 22 STAN. L. REV. 510 (1970); Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.
LAW & ECON. 55 (1968); Nelson, supra note 6; Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regu.
lation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969); Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation: A
Reply, 22 STAN. L. REV. 540 (1970); Shepherd, Regulation and Its Alternatives, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 529 (1970); Swidler, Comments on the Case for Deregulation, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 519 (1970).
8. Waverman, The "Natural" Monopoly, Tie Federal Cointiunications Conmission
and the Regulation of Intercity Telecommunications (paper presented at the Conference
on Antitrust and Regulated Industries, Oct. 28 and 29, 1971, Brookings Institution, Wash-
ington, D.C.). Zimmerman, Legal Overview of Antitrust Policies Toward Regulated Indus-
tries (preliminary draft for Brookings Institution, 1971, on file with the authors).
9. B. BEHLING, COMPEITION AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 19"20 (1938).
10. United Parcel Service now has inter-city mail service in selected areas. See, e.g.,
Wall St. J., Dec., 19, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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Second, in its application, the grasp of natural monopoly can ex-
ceed its reach. Assuming arguendo that AT&T does have a natural
monopoly in interstate telephone communications, the manufacture
of telephone equipment is decidedly not part of it;" yet AT,T's tele-
phones are provided by Western Electric, its wholly owned subsidiary.
While there are large economies of scale in the generation and trans-
mission of electric power, they do not exist in its distribution, but the
large scales of the former are often used to justify unnecessarily large
scale in the latter.'12 Finally, whatever the original reason for regulating
the railroads, truck transportation is as close to the model of pure com-
petition as exists in the economy; 13 yet the regulation of railroads led
Congress to approve the regulation of this competing mode.' 4 In sum,
ill-defined natural monopoly situations are often used to justify the
regulation of non-natural monopoly markets.
Besides natural monopoly, other controversial public interest ration-
ales are offered for economic regulation. Economic failure may be
judged too damaging to be tolerated. Here some would cite banking
as a prime example. Others, however, believe more competition in
banking could benefit the consumer by raising interest rates on de-
posits, creating more convenient locations, and encouraging the type
of higher-risk loans which over-cautious loan officials avoid.1 Limited
space, historically true for airlines as well as radio and television spec-
trums, supposedly requires government allocation among applicants.";
Yet both cable and satellite advances have antiquated the concept of
spectrum scarcity. Destructive competition, which in a capital-intensive
industry can lead to below-cost (predatory) pricing and deterioration of
11. Such manufacturing industries do not exhibit the characteristics of natural mo-
nopolies. The manufacture of telephone equipment does not require vast overhead invest-
ment, and therefore lacks the extreme economies of scale present in those industries re-
puted to be natural monopolies. See C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF R.EGULATION 22
(1965); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PE ROMR.--wic, 519-20
(1971).
12. K HN, supra note 6, at 125. W.J. Primeux, Jr., A Reexamination of the Monopoly
Market Structure for Electric Utilities, Conference Paper, supra note 8.
13. J. 'EYER, f. PECK, J. STENASOX & C. ZwicK, THE EcoNoics OF Co.'L-rrroc IN
THE TRx-ANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 211-15 (1959) [hereinafter cited as MEYER LT AL]; J.
BLAIR, EcoNoM.Ic COxCNTRATION 396 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BLIR]. See also Turner,
The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 I . L. Rxy. 1207,
1232-33 (1969).
14. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1935).
15. Turner, supra note 13, at 1233-34; Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J. LAw
& EcoN. 129 (1967). The prospect of bank failures should now be far less troubling, gihen
the rise of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which can insure against loss es up
to $20,000 per account.
16. "The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious; they cannot be left to
wasteful use without detriment to the public interest." National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
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quality,17 is another justification for economic regulation. While this
phrase is sometimes used by industrialists today to mean stiff competi-
tion, and while this did occur to some extent in the early days of pre-
regulation, contemporary commentators question its present day like-
lihood in many industries.18 More importantly, the antitrust laws al-
ready proscribe destructive and monopolistic competition. Finally, guar-
anteeing service to sparsely populated areas may require regulation.
Thus, long-distance, well-traveled air routes are overcharged in order
to subsidize shorter, less popular ones.'0 Yet if a route is considered in
the public interest, it would seem the burden should fall on all equally
via a subsidy from general tax revenues rather than from an implicit
tax on certain commuters hundreds of miles away. Moreover, as such
subsidies are created by agency action without public hearing or com-
ment, there is little guarantee that wise economic decisions result.2 0
Thus these reasons for regulation are no longer convincing, if they
ever were. They are often contradictory. Sometimes regulation seeks to
avoid excessive monopoly, sometimes excessive competition. At times
regulation is over price but not entry (insurance), at other times over
entry but not price (television and radio). Some agencies have "primary
jurisdiction" (CAB, ICC), while others do not (FPC, FCC). Moreover,
these regulatory justifications fail, in the final analysis, to explain why
certain industries are "clothed with a public interest" while others are
not.2 ' Why, for one example, are motor carriers strictly regulated but
not automobile production? The latter is far more oligopolistic and
inflicts far more "externalities" than does trucking. In short, since little
is known about how regulation affects the market performance of an
industry,22 and since Congress has often failed to give any guidance to
17. KAHN, supra note 6, at 172-78.
18. See R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATION 431 (1962); MEYER ET AL., supra
note 13, at 249-50.
19. See Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016, 1017-18
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Noll]. The CAB has occasionally justified this cross.subsidy by
arguing that the "national interest" requires a complete airline network. Id. at 1018. 11-
terestingly, this is not an official agency position but a justification in individual route
awards and fare decisions. See G. FADS, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT AFTFR
TWENTY-FIvE YEARS (1972). But cf. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 J. ECON. & IMANAGE.
Sci. 22 (1971).
20. In addition to this implicit subsidy is a direct subsidy from the federal government
to air carriers which amounted to 5667 million in the proposed 1974 fiscal budget. OFrsIcE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (1973).
21. " . . [T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest and has been
devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what Is dis.
agreeable to the sufferers. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when
compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when It has a
sufficient force of public opinion behind it." Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
22. See Caves, supra note 1.
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the courts or agencies other than admonitions to act in the public inter-
est,23 our government has little idea of when to regulate.24 Conse-
quently, like an architect without blueprints, economic regulation is
unsure of itself and confused about its purpose.
B. Process
Aggravating this failure of design is a failure of process. The opera-
tional woes of regulation have been extensively discussed and need only
be sketched briefly.23 First there is delay, "the Achilles heel of the regu-
latory process."26 Inflexibility very often results from bureaucratic aver-
sion to new ideas and new ways.27 There is often a lack of accurate and
adequate information on which to make regulatory decisions,28 a defi-
ciency in part responsible for the lack of a presumed2 1 expertness by
23. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: Ara Abdi-
cation of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436, 438 (1954).
Other scholars are even less charitable about defective designs of regulation. Economist
Horace Gray states:
The public utility status was to be the haven and refuge for all aspiring monopolists
who found it too difficult, too costly, or too prccarious to secure and maintain monop-
oly by private action alone. Their future prosperity would be assured if only they"
could induce the government to grant them monopoly power and to protect them
against interlopers.
Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. L*4ND & P.U. EcoN. 8. 9 (1940).
24. Loevinger, Regulation and Competition as Alternatives, II Alrrmusr BULL. 101,
115-16 (1966).
25. See generally L. KOHLMNEIER JL, TiE REGULTOLrS (1969); R. Feilmeth. The Regu-
latory-Industrial Complex, in rrH JUSTICE FOR SOME (B. Wasserstein and M. Green eds.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Fellmeth]. Many well known studies hase concerned themsebes
with the organization and inefficiency of government regulatory procedures. See, e.g.,
CoM.M. ON INDEPENDENT REGUL ATORY Comas'Ns, REPORT (1949); J. LA %Ds, REPORT ON REGU-
LATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECr (1960); TaE P IEs|.Trs ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULALTORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDE-
PENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971).
26. J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGEN cIES TO T"mE lPREstOaicr-ELEcr 5-6 (1960).
27. See p. 881 infra. See also P. MAeAvoy, TuE COusts OF TawE REGuL oRy Co.m-
MISSIONS Vii-Viii (1970).
28. For example, in mid-1970 the Federal Power Commission predicted that the coun-
try would suffer an oil and gas shortage that winter. How did it know? Oil and gas trade
associations must have told it so, since the FPC lacks the independent capabilities to
measure existing energy capacity. See, e.g., Concentration by Competing Raw Fuel Indus-
tries in the Energy Market and Its Impact on Small Business, Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Special Small Business Problems of the House Select Comm. on Small Business,
92d Cong., Ist Sess., Vol. 1, at 13 (1971). Similarly, in December, 1971 the Federal Coin-
munications Commission, citing inadequate staff, announced it was canceling its investi-
gation into AT&T's rate base and asked for "voluntary cooperation" from the telephone
giant. N.Y. Times, December 24, 1971, at 1, col. 2. The agency, under heasy public criti-
cism, later reinitiated its inquiry.
Another obstacle to the collection of needed data has been the 1942 Federal Reports
Act, which requires that requests for information originating with an) government agency
(with certain exceptions) and going to nine or more respondents ntust be cleared by the
Office of Management and Budget. Because the OMB defers to business advisory groups,
such requests are often denied or delayed. See Green, Business in Government, Ni"
REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 1970, at 14, col. 1-2.
29. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bros. 291 US. 304, 314 (1934).
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agencies. 30 Business pressure also exerts a continuous, one-sided regu-
latory presence, dominating agency decisions by the sheer quantity of
argument; business lobbying can also include a range of activities from
ex parte contacts to outright corruption. 31 Political independence for
agencies is often illusory due to the clearance of agency budgets by the
Office of Management and Budget, the appointment of commissioners
and chairmen by the President, and agency catering to congressional
requests.3 2 Finally, a kind of regular personnel interchange between
agency and industry blurs what should be a sharp line between regula-
tor and regulatee, and can compromise independent regulatory judg-
ment.33 In short, the regulated industries are often in clear control of
the regulatory process.
3 4
II. The Costs of Over-Regulation
These defects of design and process result in regulatory policies
which often frustrate, rather than promote, economic competition.
30. Only three of eleven recent ICC Commissioners had any transportation experience
prior to their official tenure, while the rest were mostly ex-FBI agents and politicos.
R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMIsSIoN 2-5 (1970). At his Senate confirmation
hearing upon appointment to the FCC, one nominee was asked about his qualifications
in the communications field. He replied, "Senator, I don't know anything about commt-
nications. I came to Washington expecting to be appointed to the Federal 'ower Com-
mission." KOHLMEIER, supra note 25, at 48.
31. For an interesting case study of industry-agency corruption, see Rosenblum, How
to Get into TV: The Federal Communications Commission and Miami's Channel 10,
THE USES OF POWER 173 (A. Westin ed. 1956). When Dr. Herbert Ley resigned as FDA
Commissioner in 1969, he lamented to the New York Times that lie had been tinder
"consistent, tremendous, sometimes unmerciful pressure" from the drug industry. "Some
days I spent as many as six hours fending off representatives of the drug industry." N.Y.
Times, December 31, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
32. If a regulator does his job too well, incurring the displeastre of the regulated
industry, his reappointment can be jeopardized. The cases of Dean James Landis, formerly
of the CAB, and Leland Olds, formerly of the FPC, may be two indications. See J.P. HAR-
RIs, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 178-194, 277 (1953). For descriptions of the
political context of regulation, see M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. (1972); J. TURNER,
THE CHEMICAL FEAsT (1970); FELLMETH, supra note 30.
33. All but two of the ICC Commissioners leaving that agency in the 1960's either
went into transportation directly or became "ICC Practitioners" lawyering for the indus.
try. FELLMETH, supra note 30, at 251. From the other end, one study found the following
percentage of appointees coming from the regulated industry: SEC-thirty-four percent;
ICC-twenty-one percent; CAB-nineteen percent; FCC-fourteen percent; FPC-twelve
percent. D. STANLEY, D. MANN & J. DOIG, MEN WHO GOVERN 136 (1967).
34. M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMIMISSION 90 (1955). Some
people may view the problem of economic regulation as giant bureaucracies steamrolling
over helpless regulatees. This is far from the case. The total budget for the six major
regulatory agencies (FCC, ICC, SEC, FPC, CAB, FMC) is $132,315,000 for fiscal year 1973,
which is about .05 percent of the federal budget. Their total manpower is 7246. Tim
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1973--APPENDIX 884-929, 1050-55 (1972).
Vol. 82: 871, 197.3
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A. Rate-Regulation
Non-regulated pricing aims at distribution which maximizes the out-
put of goods and services, thus optimizing consumer welfare. Regu-
lated pricing seeks to produce enough revenue for all regulated firms,
the efficient and the not-so-efficient, to cover their costs and generate
profits. Such price paternalism in the name of industry stability often
leads to industry collusion, waste, and hence higher-than-competitive
prices. 35
Rate-regulation can take two forms. Rate-setting, done by state pub-
lic utility commissions and the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau, in-
volves the determination of a firm's permissible profits, and is tied by
a "fair rate of return" to the value of a company's assets. This return
must not be so high as to exploit consumers or induce inefficiency, nor
so low as to discourage investors-a fine line extremely difficult to
draw.3
6
The problem is administrative as well as judgmental. The private
firm makes initial managirial decisions, with the regulatory body re-
duced to a defensive posture after-the-fact. Furthermore, obtaining
the necessary cost data from corporate managers can be a herculean
chore.37 Since state public utility commissioners and federal agencies
lack adequate staffs to challenge effectively utilities seeking rate in-
creases, there comes to be "regulation which does not regulate." 38 The
self-interest in inflating asset values to yield higher returns can induce
regulated firms to doctor their data by a variety of accounting devices.30
Or they may engage in uneconomical activities such as overcapitalizing
due to a reluctance to lease from others, resisting capital-saving tech-
nology, or being lax in procurement policies.40 In addition, firms may
try to emasculate profit ceilings by cutting costs or quality. The result
can be unplanned profitability.4' In fact, although utilities never risk
failure or zero profits as do non-regulated firms, their profits are com-
parable to the rest of American manufacturing, about ten percent after-
35. SCHERER, supra note 11, at 537; Noll, supra note 19.
36. SCHERER, supra note 11, at 523-537; Frankfurter & Hart, Rate Regulation reprinted
in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY Co..ItzssIONs 1 (P. MacAvoy d. 1970).
37. See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. OF L. AN EcON. 1, 18
(1959) on the problem of insufficient data and price systems.
38. V. MUND & R. VoLF, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PuBuc PoLICY 379 (1971).
39. See J. NEWFIELD & J. GREENFIELD, THE POPULIST MANIFEsTO 67-88 (1972).
40. KAHN, supra note 6, at 47-63. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firn Under Regu-
latory Constraint, 52 AMt. EcoN. REV. 1052 (1962).
41. While New York Telephone was permitted a 6.5 percent return from 1959-1968,
it actually earned 7.3 percent, which is a $50 million differential; similarly although the
FPC in 1967 authorized AT&T to earn 7 percent to 7.5 percent, it actually earned 8.3
percent. NEwFIELD & GREENFIELD, supra note 39, at 77.
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tax return on equity. 42 Consequently, regulation does not significantly
affect either utility rates or price discrimination. 43
The second and more common form of rate regulation is rate tolera-
tion. Agencies such as the ICC, CAB, and the FMC (Federal Maritime
Commission) depend on industry collaboration in so-called "rate con-
ferences" to set prices.44 Here cartel "self-regulation" proposes and the
government disposes. This process tends to pervert even the theoretical
basis for regulation, viz., that the government protects the public by
assuring that private firms with undue market power not charge higher
than competitive prices.
Although the ICC can independently investigate a rate proposal, it
does so in less than one percent of the carriers' rate filings.45 Similarly,
the CAB did not have to acquiesce to the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) when that world cartel began to set prices in
194646 nor does it have to approve with regularity fare increases pro-
posed by domestic air carriers.47 The higher prices that result discour-
age many potential air travelers from utilizing air service.48 Moreover,
42. Noll, supra note 19, at 1022-23.
43. See, e.g., Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Elec.
tricity, 5 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1962).
44. These conferences have, if nothing else, tenacity and longevity. When an 1897
Supreme Court decision declared such railroad rate conferences illegal (United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 116 U.S. 290 (1897)), the ICC permitted them to coll-
tinue. They were again declared illegal by the Court in 1945. Georgia v. Pennsylvania Co.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945). Instead of violating the law this time, the ICC made one. Passed over
President Truman's veto in 1948, the Reed-Bulwinkle Act provided that the Commission
could approve of agreements between carriers to establish rates if such an approval was
in "furtherance of the national transportation policy." 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1959). The FMC
has similar power. See 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1946).
45. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 258 (1972)
(statement of G. Stafford, Chairman of the ICC).
46. See IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639 (1946). The CAB explained
that it felt pressured by foreign governments over the right of American planes to land
abroad, despite the fact that we had already secured, through bilateral agreements, land.
ing rights in most of the world. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regu-
lated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 k-ARv. L. R'v. 436, 454 (1951).
47. W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REcULATION IN AMERICA 57-72 (1970).
48. Domestic and international airline rates may be fifty percent too high due to
collusion by the airline trade association. See Pillai, The CAB as Travel Regulator, Tue
MONOPOLY-MAKERS (M. Green ed. 1973) (forthcoming). For one example, while the 310-
mile, unregulated (intrastate) Los Angeles-San Francisco plane trip costs $16.20, a trip of
equivalent distance between Chicago and Minneapolis costs $33 and the New York City-
Washington shuttle (230 miles) costs $26. William Jordan has concluded that agencies
served producers, not consumers:
The available evidence regarding the effects of regulation on price level for former
oligopolistic industries is consistent and unambiguous. Regulatory actions and pro.
cedures have allowed the carriers in each industry to reach agreements regarding
prices and to enforce adherence to these agreements .. . . Without regulation prices
[for interstate airlines, freight motor carriers, and railroads] would be from 9 to 50
percent lower than they are with regulation with many reductions in the long-rtn
exceeding 30 percent.
Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regu-
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the absence of any price competition among such firms leads to a frantic
"service competition," which in turn can cause massive waste. Thus,
while some industries, like public utilities, may require improved rate
scrutiny, others, like some segments of transportation, may deserve no
rate regulation at all.
40
B. Entry Restrictions
Most regulatory agencies restrict the entry of new competitors into
their regulated industries. An entrant may, for example, have to obtain
a certificate of public convenience or necessity by showing that there is
a need for another firm and that he can satisfy it.5'° Instead of competi-
tive market forces, an agency determines whether a new venture is pub-
licly desirable. While this system enhances the value of existing lines
by the imposition of artificial scarcity, it also encourages inefficiency
and "the quiet life" of monopolists who lack the stimulus of potential
competition.
Agencies appear to be far more restrictive toward entrants than they
need be. The CAB has not certified a new trunk carrier since immedi-
ately after its creation in 1938.51 Yet within the confines of California,
where CAB jurisdiction does not extend, sixteen intrastate carriers
entered the market between 1946 and 1965.52 The Food and Drug
Administration thwarts competition by the bureaucratic legerdemain
of "New Drug Applications." Of course, the safety of newly marketed
drugs must be shown by extensive clinical studies. But there is little
need to require such tests, often costing $50,000 to .100,000, for each
successive application of drugs chemically identical to those already on
the market.53 The rule does not contribute to drug safety, but it does
bar smaller competitors and entrench the dominance of existing drug
houses. For another example, the ICC not only restricts the entry of
new truck firms into existing markets-an industry where entry would
be relatively inexpensive-but also imposes a network of other controls
to insure the immutability of the system.5
4
lation, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 151, 167 (1972) (emphasis added). See also W. JO"A%, supra
note 46; G. KoLKO, supra note 4, at 210-17; P. MAcAvoY, THE Ecoxo.uc EFFEcTs OF REGU-
LATION: THE TRUNK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMiMISSIoN BE-
FoRE 1900, at 25-152 (1965).
49. See p. 884 infra.
50. See generally KoHL.iFR, supra note 25, at 105-09; BLAR, supra note 13, at 396.93.
51. Pillai, supra note 48.
52. JORDAN, supra note 47, at 172.
53. BLAIR, supra note 13, at 399-400. See Till, Drug Procurement High on Drugs, in M.
Green, supra note 48.
54. Various restrictions on motor carriers are imposed on routes and commodities. 49
U.S.C. § 308 (1966); 49 C.F.R. § 1040-1069 (1972).
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In industries where the number of operators has been limited, entry
can be restricted in other ways so as to stifle potential competition and
favor established enterprises. For example, until 1969, the FCC had
never refused to renew a broadcaster's license on comparative service
grounds.15 When it finally did refuse one renewal, the broadcast indus-
try attempted to have the FCC Act revised.50 Reacting to this pressure,
the Commission issued a policy statement indicating that incumbent
applicants would receive preferential consideration if past service was
substantial,57 though this policy was later found to be in violation of
the Act.58
C. Mergers
While new entrants must make an affirmative showing to earn their
very existence, mergers by statute are usually only limited by a require-
ment that they be "consistent with the public interest.'" 0 Competition
seldom survives the ad hoc arguments which can be deployed to justify
nearly any merger: labor savings, complementary managements, over-
capacity, and so on.
Examples of regulatory permissiveness are numerous. The ICC ap-
proved thirty of the thirty-four major railroad mergers it has consid-
ered. 0 Between 1960 and 1962, the Comptroller approved 232 of 239
bank merger applications; between 1966 and 1969, after the Philadel-
phia Bank decision held that the antitrust laws applied to banking,
402 of 406 were approved while only fifteen were voluntarily aban-
doned. 61 The FCC approved the 1967 acquisition of ABC by ITT after
considering the Justice Department's Antitrust Division's objections for
all of one day,0 2 though ITT later voluntarily withdrew its proposal.
The Supreme Court has now said three times that the acquisition by
El Paso Natural Gas of the Pacific Northwest Gas Company, approved
55. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (1970) cert. den., 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
56. See Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
57. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C. 2d 424 (1970).
58. Citizens' Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
59. Interstate Commerce Commission Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(b) (1970); Civil Aeronautics
Board Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970); Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 222(b)(1),
§ 222(c) (1970).
60. FELLMErH, supra note 30, at 94.
61. Interview with Daniel Friedman, Assistant Solicitor General, Sept. 17, 1970. This
high rate of approval exists despite the fact that the antitrust laws apply to banking.
See U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
62. Interview by the author with D. Turner, former assistant Attorncy.General In
charge of antitrust, Sept. 22, 1970.
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by the FPC, violated the antitrust laws and should not have been per-
mitted.63 Recently the Antitrust Division has increasingly intervened
in agency proceedings as an antitrust advocate. But with certain excep-
tions (like banking and communications), the doctrine of "primary
jurisdiction" means that the regulatory agencies, and not the Anti-




Technological lethargy seems to inhere in the very process of regu-
lation.65 A firm with a stable rate base and rate of return lacks the com-
petitive spur to be innovative. In fact, since a firm's return depends on
the extent of its capital investment, it is encouraged even as it buys
new capital to retain older and obsolete equipment in order to inflate
its rate base. 66 Regulators and regulatees are both wary of technological
breakthroughs which topple a well-nurtured, highly-valued regulatory
system.6 7 Agencies tend to approve important innovations only after
years of delays and pressure: Consider, for example, container ships,
"Big John" boxcars, "piggyback" operations in mail transport, "foreign
attachments" to the AT&T telephone system, and (to a certain extent)
cable television. 8
While few would deny that government regulation for public health
and safety is essential, the verdict is nearly unanimous that economic
regulation over rates, entry, mergers, and technology has been anti-
competitive and wasteful. In recent years, the Johnson Antitrust Task
Force, the Nixon Antitrust Group, and the Council of Economic Ad-
visors have all concluded that regulated industries need, and the public
interest demands, increased competition.00 For the costs of economic
63. Utah Public Service Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 395 U.S. 464 (1968);
Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1965); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
64. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1964). See Schwmrtz, supra
note 23, at 471.
65. There is a longstanding dispute whether giant firms, of the kind often under
regulation, are a prerequisite or deterrent to innovation. For the argument that it is a
prerequisite, see J.K. GArBRArrH, THE NEW INDUSrRtAL STATE (1967); for the argument
that it is a deterrent, see Blair, supra note 13, esp. chs. 5, 9, 10.
66. C. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION Ch. VII (1964).
67. "No matter how beneficial an innovation, it has little chance of timely adoption
in a regulated industry if it will lead to a substantial redistribution of wealth among the
regulated that cannot be compensated through some clever regulatory device." R. No.L,
REFORIMING REGULATION 25 (1971).
68. See Noll, supra note 19, at 1022-23 (1971); TEcih'wot.OCtcA CLANGES IN REGULATED
INDUSTRIES (W. CAPRON ed. 1971).
69. In 1968, the Johnson Antitrust Task Force stated:
In the regulated sector of the economy, the bias and its enforcement is overwhelm-
ingly against competition. This bias manifests itself in more permissive policies to-
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regulation are becoming intolerable. The list below, based on the best
evidence available, estimates the economic losses due to the regulation
of transportation and communication.
Economic Waste
Sector From Regulation
ICC: Increased costs and shifting of traffic from 54-8.7 billion 0
low cost to high cost modes, involving railroads,
trucks, water carriers.
CAB: Trade associations and price-fixing. $2-$4 billion 1
FMC: Merchant marine price-fixing. $2-$3.5 billion
72
FCC: "Additional value to consumers" if FCC 58 billion 3
reallocated TV channels so as to permit seven
national networks rather than three.
TOTAL $16-$24.2 billion7"
ward mergers and exemption of mergers from antitrust standards .... We believe
this bias is contrary to the public interest.
Reprinted in Hearings on Price Discrimination Legislation-1969, Before the Senate
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1969).
The Nixon Antitrust Group, headed by George Stigler, criticized regulatory restrictions
on entrants and rates:
[T]he commissions should have the merits of competition pressed upon them. Coin.
petition is not a matter of all or none, and the fact of regulation should not exclude
competition as a force at each of a hundred points where it is relevant and feasible.
Id. at 3. Finally, the Council of Economic Advisors also concltded:
Industries have been more progressive when the agencies have endeavored to con-
fine regulation to a necessary minimum and have otherwise fostered competition.
When regulation has stifled competition, performance has deteriorated. The clearest
lesson of all, however, is that regulation should be narrowed or halted when it has
outlived its original purpose.
COUNCIL OF EcONOMIC ADvisoRs, ECONOMIC REPORT OF TIlE PRESIDENT 108 (1970).
70. Moore, The Feasibility of Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation (paper
presented at the Conference on Antitrust and Regulated Industries, October 28 and 29,
1971, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.).
71. Passell & Ross, Mr. Nixon's Economic Melodrama, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Sept. 23,
1971, at 8, cols. 2-3, referring to Levine, Is Air Regulation Necessary? California Air Trans.
portation and National Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965).
72. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, LEGAL IMIPEDIMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL
INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION 42 (1971).
73. McGowen, Noll & Peck, Subsidization through Regulation: The Case of Comner-
cial Television Broadcasting, paper prepared for Joint Economic Committee review of
government subsidy programs and policies as part of the Brookings Institution Studies
in the Regulation of Economic Activity, December 1971, at 35-40.
74. Many other serious economic losses inflicted by government activity are not in.
cluded here. There is no reliable information on the precise competitive costs incurred
4y the internal inefficiency of AT&T's rate schedule, or the federal drug procurement
program. The total consumer cost of tariff and quota restrictions may be between ,10
billion and $15 billion annually. C. BERGSTEN, THE COST OF IMPoRr RESTRICIONS 10
AMERICAN CONSUMERS 4 (1972). His tariff component is only $2 billion, although he
characterizes the $10 billion estimate of tariff costs by Neuman Fieleke as a "platisible
maximum." See Fieleke, The Cost of Tariffs to Consumers, NEW ENGLAND ECoN. REV.,
Sept.-Oct., 1971, at 13. Other estimates range as high as $20 billion. 118 CON(. Rrc.
S 16623 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1972).
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In sum, at least two conclusions emerge about our present system of
economic regulation. First, the monopolistic practices and results of
economic regulation exact their tribute from the American economy
and consumer. Excessive rates mean higher consumer prices for both
products and services-prices which may bar the lower-income citizen
entirely. Second, because we have no clear understanding of who or
when to regulate, we have regulated too much.
III. Proposals for Reform
This nation's industrial economy and system of antitrust enforce.
ment was founded on the premise that,
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress . . .
Regulation, however, is a pallid substitute for true competition." At
best, regulation is a negative process, occasionally enjoining bad be-
havior but rarely compelling good. Hence, our general industrial pol-
icy should encourage competition in our economy by minimizing regu-
lation, except when clearly necessary. With this theoretical framework
in mind, we must both avoid over-regulation and limit the anticom-
petitiveness of "necessary" regulation.
77
A. Deregulation
If the problem is over-regulation based on irrational economics, then
the most effective remedy is deregulation. Where there would be a
viable, competitive market but for economic regulation, the industry
should be freed from all such restraint. By this standard, trucking, air,
and water transport, radio and television could return to the open
75. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 4 (1958).
76. Economist Clair Wilcox argues:
[It] cannot prescribe quality, force efficiency, or require innoiation, because such
action would invade the sphere of management. But when it leaves these matters to
the discretion of industry, it denies consumers the protection that competition would
afford. Regulation cannot set prices below an industry's costs however exceive they
may be. Competition does so, and the high-cost company is comnpelled to discoier
means whereby its costs can be reduced. Regulation does not enlarge consumption
by setting prices at the lowest level consistent with a fair return. Competition has
this effect. Regulation fails to encourage performance in the public interest by offer-
ing rewards and penalties. Competition offers both.
C. "VILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES ToWARD BUSINESS 476-77 (1966).
77. Procedural alternatives are not considered here. Sec pp. 875-76 supra.
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market;78 whether natural gas field prices should be similarly deregu-
lated, when higher consumer prices would undoubtedly result, is pres-
ently under intense debate.79 Where economic regulation substitutes
for the kind of managerial decisions, such as pricing, which are usually
within the domain of private competitive firms, deregulation should
also occur. Thus, railroad, transoceanic shippers, and airlines should
no longer be able to price-fix with (or without) agency approval,
though in certain limited situations, maximum rates might still be
necessary.80 They could then compete on price, instead of on the color
of their planes or the hemline of their stewardesses' skirts. The savings
generated by such reform should be enormous.
But deregulation, if it is to occur, has a number of necessary pre-
conditions and qualifications. First, a viable competitive market must
be able to exist; if a well-defined "natural monopoly" or "natural oli-
gopoly" characterizes the market, then the deregulation cure may prove
no better than its regulatory disease. Second, antitrust policy and en-
forcement must be well-funded and vigorous to deter collusion or con-
78. See Turner, supra note 13; MEYER ET AL., supra note 13; KAHN, supra note 6, at
178-94; P. MACAVoY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS (1962); Wall St. J., Feb,
3, 1971, at 10, col. I. There is a comparative measure of how surface transportation would
perform under deregulation. The Motor Carrier Act exempts regulation from ICC
motor vehicles carrying agricultual products. According to a Senate Small Business Com-
mittee report: "Here is an unregulated segment of the trucking industry which, accord-
ing to witnesses most intimately familiar with its operations, has admirably served the
interest of farmers, consumer and the general public." SENATE SELECT COMMirrEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS, COMPETITION, REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN TIlE MOTOR CARRIER
INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 1693, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (1956).
79. The case for the continued regulation of natural gas field rates rests upon a series
of arguments. First, regulation is required because the industry, in terms of firms bring-
ing in new supplies, is quite concentrated. D. Schwartz, Supply-Technical Advisory Task
Force-Regulation and Legislation (FPC Task Force Report, dissenting report, 1972). See
South Louisiana Area Rate Proceedings, 40 F.P.C. 530 (1968). Pipelines, which require
substantial backup reserves, supposedly are at a competitive disadvantage in dealing with
gas producers and cannot effectively bargain to keep prices down; also, because pipeline
costs are automatically passed on by the FPC, rate regulation has no incentive to keep
prices low. Schwartz, supra. Critics disagree with the natural gas industry that low
field prices discourage adequate exploration since producers are already earning fifteen per-
cent per year profit on production. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1972, at 34, col. 3 (letter of Charles
F. Wheatly, Jr.). Investigator Robert Sherrill charges that there is a coordinated cam-
paign by members of the national gas industry to convince the public that there is a gas
shortage in order to push prices up. Sherrill, Energy Crisis: Tile Industry's Fright Can-
paign, NATION, June 26, 1972, at 816. Because he believes that deregulation would lead
to unacceptably high consumer prices, Sen. Warren Magnuson has proposed to create a
federal corporation, similar to the TVA, to explore and drill for natural gas on govern-
ment land. Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
The leading advocates for deregulation are Professors Stephen Breyer and Patil Mac.
Avoy. In a forthcoming book, ENERGY REGULATION BY TIlE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,
they argue that rate regulation has led to uneconomical practices, and that there is very
little evidence of a lack of competition in field pricing. Accord, Austral Oil Co. v. FPC,
428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir., 1970); McKie, Market Structure and Uncertainty in Oil and Gas
Exploration, 74 QUART. J. OF ECON. 543 (1960). See also P. MACAVOY, supra note 75.
80. Because trucks and pipelines only marginally compete with railroad "piggyback"
services and shipment of some bulk commodities, minimum rate regulation may be neces.
sary to avoid rate gouging. MEYER Er AL., supra note 13, at 250.
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centration and achieve effective competition. We have earlier argued
that real competition rarely exists in industry:8' Not that it could not,
but that in fact it does not. Thus deregulation would have to be pre-
ceded by a serious antitrust commitment fostering deconcentration
where necessary. Third, since the introduction of competition will
cause the closing of some inefficient facilities, a complementary pro-
gram must underwrite the relocation and retraining of displaced em-
ployees. Fourth, there should be comparable insurance for customers
damaged as a result of any firm restructuring. For example, since free
entry into banking might increase the number of bank failures, federal
insurance programs should cover any resulting losses. Finally, deregu-
lation should be administered with a scalpel, not a scythe. It should not
be applied to non-economic regulation which aims to complement,
rather than replace, a market system incompetent or uninterested in
fulfilling certain social needs. This type of necessary regulation recog-
nizes that while competition may be our most efficient and equitable
resource allocator, it is still rather imperfect. Several regulatory areas
would be covered by this standard.
Safety regulation explicitly assumes that the market will not ade-
quately protect consumers against certain product hazards. Such laws
are based on the rationale that it is better to prevent consumer harm
than to compensate it later. The harm inflicted may simply be unac-
ceptable to its victims, as in deaths from dangerous drugs or crashing
airplanes. Or it may be unrealistic to assume that a manufacturer will
compensate victims: Not only may court costs pose a serious entry bar-
rier to individually small (but collectively large) damage claims, but
corporations can also employ a variety of litigative tactics to discourage
meritorious claims.8s2 Examples of this type of regulation include food
and drug safety, airline safety, auto crashworthiness, flammable fabrics,
and radiation levels.8 3
81. M. GEE, rr At-, THE CLosED ENTERPRISE SYSMTt (1972).
82. When they work effectively, the courts can be an important adjunct of the market
mechanism, a place where consumers and producers have recourse against fraudulent prac-
tices subversive of a free and fair market. Regulation can either frustrate dctizen access
to courts, as when the doctrine of primary jurisdiction operates to block the successful
filing of individual lawsuits, or it can promote the use of this self-help mechanism by
providing needed individual and agency information covered by (though not necessarily
limited to) the Freedom of Information Act. Various procedural reforms-creative small
claims courts, class actions, and improved legal services for the poor and middle income--
can help restore the court as an effective forum for aggrieved consumers and competitors.
83. It is interesting to observe how a regulation-induced characteristic can educate
and encourage consumers to desire the characteristic even if the regulations were lifted.
At one time, for example, directional signals, bumpers, and hadlamps all had to be re-
quired by law. Few auto purchasers today would buy cars without them, even if aws
requiring them were suspended. There may be little consumer demand for code-dating
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Regulation of non-market externalities would cover damage caused
to third parties who neither bought nor sold the product inflicting the
damage. For example, while dangerous cars may be sold through the
market system, no one can be said to have "bought" auto pollution.
The same is true for the risk of radiation poisoning from a nuclear
reactor. In short, producers lack a market incentive to contain certain
harms, including environmental and land use effects. Here government
standards are necessary to protect the public.
8 4
Enabling regulation establishes the necessary preconditions for com-
petitive enterprise to succeed. Antitrust law establishes the borders and
rules for economic contest. Anti-discrimination laws, occupational
health and safety requirements, and unemployment compensation estab-
lish minimal standards for the protection of the individual in the pro-
duction process. Similarly, corporate and product disclosure require-
ments are sine qua nons for investor knowledge and consumer sover-
eignty. The corporate balance sheet should be made public so the
capital market can reward and sanction firms accordingly. At the same
time product information-e.g., nutritional labeling, code dating, truth
in lending provisions-provide consumers with the intelligence neces-
sary for rational purchasing.
Yardstick enterprise might also have to be provided by the govern-
ment when industry withdraws from a market because it is perceived as
unprofitable. Such public enterprise could fulfill a public need and,
if properly circumscribed and wisely implemented, set an example for
private enterprise. For instance, railroads wish to curtail passenger
service; private insurance firms have shied away from flood and crime
insurance; and because of oversupply, oil firms for years have not been
interested in developing commercially viable processes for extracting
oil from shale.
"Yardstick" enterprise should also include government research and
development investment in areas shunned by private enterprise. De-
signs of many airplanes, some maritime ships, and nuclear power plants
at its legal inception, but one can imagine consumer complaints if in a decade food firms
stopped telling buyers when their cheese and milk became perishable. Once consumers
are alerted to the benefits of certain product protections and information, an appreciation
develops and remains.
84. Such regulation is not only theoretically distinguishable from economic regulation,
but is also far more practical. "Reducing the emission of noxious fumes or preventing the
sale of a harmful drug is conceptually and perhaps administratively easier than deciding
what allocation of television licenses will be 'in the public interest' or what price levels
are 'reasonable.'" Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulations, 25 PUBLIC INTEREST 29, 58
(1971).
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were based on government technological breakthroughs. Modular hous-
ing, a non-addictive heroin substitute, and mass transit have similarly
not yet been adequately developed and delivered by private industry.
Since the competitive market can be a poor long range planner, espe-
cially where profits are not readily apparent, government may have to
encourage innovation.
Such public enterprise may also generate beneficial secondary effects.
The TVA, by producing cheap power in the Tennessee Valley, pro-
moted industry and showed other utilities how costs and prices could
be cut without cutting profits. Government can thereby open avenues
for private enterprise by stimulating, rather than suppressing, coin-
petition.85
B. Intermediate Reforms
Because deregulation will likely encounter serious corporate oppo-
sition,8 6 and because some regulation will always be necessary, several
intermediate reforms should be instituted to ensure that competition
will be a prime consideration in the determination of regulatory stand-
ards. First, Congress should clarify the proper role and authority of
many agencies, which now find themselves in the contradictory posi-
tion of both regulating and promoting their industries. The 1887 Act
creating the ICC emphasized regulation, to fight excessive monopoly;8T
the 1920 and 1940 National Transportation Acts emphasized promo-
tion to combat excessive competition.8 8 The 1938 CAB Act does a
85. For a general discussion of the role of public enterprise, see Shepard, Public
Enterprise, CORPORATE POWER IN A.mIUc, (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973).
86. Whatever the economic merits, deregulation will be politically difficult to achieve.
Industry and agency have often built up a benign interdependence, and more competition
can only threaten both baronies. President Kennedy's 1962 transportation message did
call for the abandonment of minimum rate regulation in the shipment of bulk commodi-
ties on trucks, trains and barges. The plan, however, was buried in Congress, opposed
by the truckers, the barge operators, and the ICC. See Wilson, supra note 83, at 40.
A deregulation proposal entitled the "Regulatory Modernization Act of 1971" was
recently submitted by the Department of Transportation to Congress. H.R. 11826, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The measure had been cleared, but not endorsed, by the White
House. The bill would give carrier management more freedom to price ser ices, discourage
collective rate-making, permit the abandonment of unprofitable operations, and allow
greater freedom of entry. It was never reported out of its House Transportation and
Aeronautics Subcommittee.
87. Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
88. 41 Stat. 456 (1920), 54 Stat. 898 (1940). Yet promotion of a "national transportation
system" leads to an inefficient pricing system. Instead of traffic going to the lowest cost
mode, prices are set around the highest cost mode to distribute the business among all
carriers. Noll, supra note 19, at 1018; A. FRIEOL. DER, TuE DILFMM.S OF Fmracirr TnAhs-
PORT REGULATION 65-99 (1969).
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little of both.8 9 Second, with a budget increase to augment its present
staff, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department should increase
its interventions in agency proceedings in order to force commissioners
to listen to, and perhaps better comprehend, the antitrust impact of
their rulings. Third, the courts have mandated that agencies must con-
sider antitrust implications as part of their "public interest" standard;90
they should now go somewhat further and explicitly declare that,
since antitrust is our dominant economic philosophy, the burden is on
the agencies to show why they have departed from it when their statutes
do not require it.01 Fourth, there should be at least one economist as a
commissioner in every agency implementing economic regulation. Law-
yers and former politicians9 2 have abilities, to be sure, but certainly no
monopoly on wise economic regulation. Fifth, rate setting agencies
must develop policies to prod utilities to be efficient and cut costs; 9
such "incentive" proposals have not even been considered, much less
resolved, by utility commissions. Finally, aided by more liberal stand-
ing decisions94 and increased access to agency data under the Freedom
of Information Act, citizen suits could raise regulatory issues which
the agencies shun. "Public interest" legal counsel, as suggested at the
FCC, or a Consumer Protection Agency, as proposed by Sen. Abraham
89. 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
90. In 1963, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court held that the
antitrust laws applied to banks, the existence of the banking agencies notwithstanding,
374 U.S. 321 (1963). In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, decided the same year, the
Court said, "Repeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only if necessary
to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the mnimnum extent
necessary." 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
Two 1968 cases continued this trend. In Federal Maritime Commission v. Akliebolaget
Svenska Amerika Linien, the Court permitted the FMC to disapprove of two anticompeti-
tive shipping conference agreements under the "contrary to the public interest" standard.
390 U.S. 238 (1968). And in the most lucid language to date, the D.C. Circuit Court
emphasized in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comntission that "antitrust
concepts are intimately involved in a determination of what action is in the public inter-
est, and therefore the [Federal Power] Commission is obliged to weigh antitrust policy."
399 F.2d 953, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Because the FPC did not participate in this case, the
issue was remanded to it for further consideration.
91. New legislation, like the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970), which created this burden regarding pollution, could achieve
the same result.
92. One study found that eleven percent of commissioners of independent regulatory
bodies were ex-congressmen. STANLFY ET AL., supra note 33, at 141.
93. A sliding scale of return could be established, devised to permit a firm greater
profits only if it could provide better service at the same or lower costs; or perhaps
a public utility could be permitted any new profit level provided that it derived from
lowered prices due to innovation or cost-cutting. For an elaboration of these points,
see Moore, supra note 34.
94. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. Federal Communications
Commission, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). But cf. Sierra Club v.
Morton, Sec'y of Interior, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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Ribicoff and Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal95 but narrowly blocked in the
past two Congresses, could also represent previously ignored consumer
interests. For years the regulatory agencies acceded to producer de-
mands partly because that was the way of avoiding the embarrassment
of public criticism or reversals on appeals brought by displeased pro-
ducers. With citizen advocates now pressing their views on the agencies,
they are less prone to defer to the judgment of their "client" industries.
And so as the advocacy process becomes more competitive, so may
agency policies.
95. H.R. 14, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1177, 92d ong., Ist Sess. (1971).
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